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Abstract
We analyze presidential approval ratings in Costa Rica from 1980 
to 2016, seeking to explain typical cycles of “honeymoon”, decay, 
and recovery, and the deviations that emerge from them: the two 
presidential terms of Oscar Arias. First, we show that party frag-
mentation has affected electoral support of the winning president 
and, as a consequence, his or her approval rate at the beginning 
of the mandate (i.e. the “honeymoon”). Using time series analysis, 
we then go on to model approval ratings as a function of econom-
ic and political variables. We find that social expenditure matters 
more than the macroeconomic indicators, and that the “Arias ex-
ceptionality” could be better understood as a result of higher so-
cial expenditure during his government and the coattails of the 
Nobel Peace Prize that he was awarded. Thus, social policy could 
be added to the theories of approval as a relevant variable in some 
contexts.
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Resumen
Analizamos la aprobación presidencial en Costa Rica entre 1980 
y 2016, para explicar casos típicos de “luna de miel”, caída y re-
cuperación, así como las desviaciones que surgen en los dos pe-
ríodos presidenciales de Oscar Arias. En primer lugar, mostramos 
que la fragmentación del sistema de partidos ha afectado el apo-
yo electoral del presidente electo y consecuentemente la aproba-
ción al inicio del mandato (conocida como “luna de miel”). Con 
el análisis de series de tiempo, modelamos la aprobación en fun-
ción de variables económicas y políticas. Encontramos que el gas-
to social es más importante que los indicadores macroeconómicos 
y que la “excepcionalidad de Arias” puede ser mejor comprendi-
da como resultado del gasto social durante su gobierno y los efec-
tos del Premio Nobel de la Paz que le fue otorgado. Por lo tanto, el 
gasto social podría tomarse en cuenta en futuras investigaciones 
que busquen explicar la aprobación presidencial en contextos si-
milares.
Palabras clave: aprobación presidencial - popularidad - voto 
económico - gasto social - Costa Rica
Introduction
What makes a government liked by its citizens? What 
makes a president popular? These questions, referred to re-
spectively as executive approval and the popularity of the 
incumbent, have been studied in several developed democ-
racies. Findings are robust regarding the stable effects of 
the state of the economy on the cycle of approval (Bellucci 
& Lewis-Beck, 2011), although major events like wars and 
political scandals matter as well. Since one may wonder 
how results might behave in developing countries and in 
new democracies, scholars are recently turning their atten-
tion to novel contexts such as Latin America (Carlin, Love, & 
Martínez-Gallardo, 2015a and 2015b; Carlin & Singh, 2015; 
Johnson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2008).
Approval in Latin American countries behaves as ex-
pected: there is a pattern of honeymoon, decay, and grow-
ing support at the end (Carlin et al., 2018), and governments 
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are punished by mediocre economic performances (Lewis-
Beck & Ratto, 2013; Nadeau et al., 2017). However, devia-
tions arise upon closer inspection of individual cases. De-
spite showing the typical cycle of approval, Costa Rica, one 
of Latin America’s oldest democracies, reveals some irregu-
larities throughout the two nonconsecutive terms of former 
president Oscar Arias (Carlin et al., 2018). These outlier cas-
es offer an interesting opportunity for research.
First and foremost, Costa Rica has maintained democracy 
uninterrupted for around 70 years, counting 16 presidential 
terms and 14 individual presidents (Laura Chinchilla being 
the one woman among them) from 1949 to 2018.4 Given the 
scarcity of long-standing presidential democracies in the 
world (Cheibub, 2007), Costa Rica offers valuable data to 
test the classical function of executive approval. Secondly, 
because the deviations detected concern the same presi-
dent, his personal traits can be isolated from the structural 
conditions of a presidency; e.g. the economy. Was Arias’s 
presidency exceptional because he held office under spe-
cial circumstances, or was it exceptional notwithstanding 
those conditions? Were his policies so good that they re-
sulted in exceptionally positive ratings? Alternatively, since 
current surveys usually place Arias as the best ranked poli-
tician and former president (Ciep, 2017), are there particular 
features of his political leadership that caused his atypically 
favorable approval?
To answer these questions, we first review the main 
theories of presidential approval. Next, we give some back-
ground on the political and institutional context of Costa 
Rica, focusing on institutions related to citizens’ account-
ability and changes in the party system. This background 
information will be decisive when assessing the general-
izability of our case-study findings. We then formulate and 
justify our hypotheses regarding presidential approval in 
Costa Rica. The results show first that party fragmentation 
4 José Figueres Ferrer and Oscar Arias were reelected nonconsecutively.
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has affected the initial approval, since elected presidents 
reach office with lower electoral consensus. Second, eco-
nomic variables are not as consistent of predictors of ap-
proval as expected, while social expenditure does exhibit 
significant effects. Third, “Arias exceptionality” can best be 
understood as a combination of higher social expenditures 
and the Nobel Peace Prize with which he was presented.
Theoretical explanations of presidential approval
Research on presidential approval converges on two main 
explanatory dimensions: an economic and a political one 
(Bellucci and Lewis-Beck, 2011). That is, presidential ap-
proval is usually studied through the following function:
Popularity = f (economics, politics).
Economic explanations of approval are closely related to the 
theory of economic vote, and together form what is known 
as the vote and popularity or VP-function. This perspective 
assumes that voters and citizens reward and punish the in-
cumbent according to real economic conditions, as well as 
the economic evaluations of the citizens (see Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2007 and 2013). When people are satisfied 
with the economy, they are more prone to vote for the in-
cumbent (“V” in VP-function) in the next election and more 
eager to support the government (“P” in VP-function).
This popularity function has proven to be quite robust. 
It fits better than the vote function (Lewis-Beck and Pal-
dam, 2000), and it appears to be stable across countries 
(Bellucci and Lewis-Beck, 2011). As the latter authors say, 
“[…] the economic signal is clear and consistent. Perceiv-
ing the economy in decline, electors withdraw their support 
from the government leader” (206). Contrary to what critics 
may think, the theory does not expect people to have com-
prehensive or up-to-date knowledge of real economic con-
ditions, such as unemployment and inflation rates, and so 
forth. Instead, people’s perceptions on the general state of 
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the economy are accurate predictors of popularity (Sanders, 
2000). Interestingly, most empirical studies have only con-
sidered economic outcomes such as unemployment, GDP 
growth and inflation, largely leaving aside social invest-
ment in healthcare, education and pensions, among others, 
as explanatory variables.
Alongside the economy, other political variables also in-
fluence presidential approval. The time in office is said to 
negatively affect approval, since the incumbent must take 
decisions and react to issues that will increasingly create 
detractors (Mueller, 1970). Besides the “natural” cycle of de-
cay, specific events such as scandals can also hinder the in-
cumbent’s popularity (Carlin, Love, & Martínez-Gallardo, 2015a; 
Memoli, 2011). International, specific, and dramatic events 
that involve the country and the president directly, called 
“rally ’round the flag” points (Mueller, 1970: 21), affect exec-
utive approval either in positive or negative ways (Gronke 
& Brehm, 2002). Likewise, public reaction toward an event 
and the consequence on approval depends on how the me-
dia handles the event –i.e. priming (Bellucci & De Ange-
lis, 2013; Kelleher & Wolak, 2006; Newman & Forcehimes, 
2010)– and the salience of the issues (Edwards, Mitchell, & 
Welch, 1995; McAvoy, 2006).
Institutions are only indirectly related to approval. Powell 
and Whitten (1993) coined the concept of “clarity of respon-
sibility” for institutional features that have a moderating 
effect on popularity; that is, they do not directly influence 
approval, but indirectly affect the ability of citizens to assign 
responsibility for economic and political outcomes. For in-
stance, the difference between presidential and parliamen-
tary systems is noteworthy. In the former, like Costa Rica, 
the capacity to judge government performance is higher 
since no other mechanism besides elections can remove 
the head of the executive, placing increased emphasis on 
popular approval (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008). Moreover, 
approval in presidential regimes underscores the leader as 
an individual, whilst the parliamentarian system stresses 
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the role of the party in government.5 Another critical insti-
tutional feature that conditions approval is the unified ver-
sus divided government (Powell & Whitten, 1993). Minority 
governments are more capable of blaming other parties for 
their failures, although their effects on approval might vary 
according to the policy area (Carlin, Love, & Martínez-
Gallardo, 2015b). All in all, there is a complex relationship 
between outcomes, institutions, and popularity.
Studying approval in Latin America and Costa Rica
Recently, the VP-function has been put to the test in the 
Latin American region, using the vote as the dependent 
variable (Lewis-Beck & Ratto, 2013; Murillo and Visconti, 
2017; Nadeau et al., 2017; Ratto, 2013).The research agenda 
on popularity is experiencing fruitful development as well 
thanks to the new Executive Approval Database 1.0 (Carlin 
et al., 2016). This source combines data on popularity from 
different surveys across nations and time, estimating a sole 
indicator of approval based on James Stimson’s (1991) algo-
rithm.
This dataset has proven useful in testing the impact of 
scandals on approval under diverse economic conditions 
among Latin American countries (Carlin, Love, & Martínez-
Gallardo, 2015a), studying the effects of the institutional 
powers of the presidency (Carlin and Singh, 2015), analyz-
ing the relationship between clarity of responsibility and 
policy domains (Carlin, Love, & Martínez-Gallardo, 2015b), 
and confirming the cyclicality over the presidential term 
(Carlin et al., 2018).6
Regretfully, not many studies have dealt specifically 
with government approval in Costa Rica. One of a handful 
was performed by Seligson and Gómez (1987), who found 
5 We thank Professor Paolo Bellucci for this point.
6 Due to space constraints, we are not reviewing individual studies of approval 
in Latin American countries.
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Costa Rican citizens to be sensitive to the economic crisis of 
the 1980s, when inflation, unemployment, and public debt 
rose to unprecedented levels. They showed that Costa Ri-
cans blamed politicians for the crisis, as expected by the 
economic theories of popularity.
It is intriguing that most studies of public opinion in 
Costa Rica have placed more emphasis on system support 
than executive approval (e.g. Alfaro-Redondo and Seligson, 
2012; Booth and Seligson, 2009; Seligson, 2002; Vargas-
Cullell, Rosero-Bixby, & Seligson 2004). We therefore 
suggest that, given the accomplishments of Costa Rica’s 
democracy in terms of stability and consolidation, it is time 
to turn the attention from the way people see democracy 
to their evaluation of their government’s performance. Be-
fore delving into typical and atypical patterns of approval 
in Costa Rica, however, we describe the institutional and 
political context in which government operates.
Institutional and political context of the case
To understand approval in the case of Costa Rica we focus 
on three institutional and contextual features: presidential 
powers, or lack thereof; changes in political and electoral 
competition; and the welfare regime.
Institutional features. Costa Rica stands out among oth-
er countries in the region for its democratic stability, and 
scholars classify the political regime as a full and uninter-
rupted democracy since 1953 (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 
2013).
Like any other presidential regime, the national execu-
tive branch is headed by the President of the Republic, who 
is directly elected by the citizens for a four-year term, along 
with two vice presidents on the same ticket. In the direct 
election of the president, candidates need 40% of the valid 
votes to win; if this majority is not reached, a second elec-
toral round is necessary (runoff). Legislative elections take 
place concurrent with the first round and there are no mid-
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term elections. This institutional arrangement discourages 
split-ticket voting, thus promoting legislative majorities in 
favor of the elected president (Sánchez, 2007); however, 
this has been a harder goal to achieve since 1998.
The Constitution of 1949 established the attributions 
and duties of the presidency, as well as the relationship 
between the executive and the other branches of the gov-
ernment. Despite being a presidential system, in which the 
perception of citizenship is that the president predomi-
nates, the real capacity to govern largely depends on co-
ordinated work with the parliament (Ramírez Cover, 2016: 
12). The legislative and decree powers of the president are 
limited. According to the Institutional Legislative Power 
Index by Santos, Pérez-Liñán, & García (2014), Costa Rica 
ranks last among the sampled countries with a 0.32 and 
well below the Latin American mean of 0.46. Although the 
power to designate and remove ministers and vice minis-
ters belongs exclusively to the president, the work of the 
executive is advanced on a collegiate basis, as acts of gov-
ernment must be endorsed both by the president and the 
appropriate minister. In addition, the Legislative Assem-
bly exercises control over the cabinet via the minister’s ap-
pearance in plenary and the possibility of censorship. In 
brief, the formal power of the president in Costa Rica is 
weak.
Another important feature regarding the presidency 
concerns the rules of reelection. Although it can work as 
a mechanism for rewarding or punishing incumbents, Lat-
in American voters generally view reelection as a form of 
power accumulation, or continuismo (McConnell, 2010). In 
Costa Rica, a ruling of the Constitutional Court has allowed 
non-consecutive reelection of the president since 2003,7 
limiting the accountability mechanisms available for the 
7 This result came from the appeal presented twice by Oscar Arias to the Con-
stitutional Chamber that ruled that the impossibility of a second term is un-
constitutional (see Treminio, 2015). Besides Arias, former president José María 
Figueres pursued reelection in 2018 but failed to get the party nomination.
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citizens at elections, which can reward or punish the party 
(Pignataro, 2017) but not the incumbent president.
Party system.While the institutional framework of the 
executive branch has been quite stable since the 1949 Con-
stitution (except for reelection rules), the party system has 
changed dramatically in the past 20 years.
Political competition after the Civil War of 1948 has been 
characterized by two main political blocks, showing differ-
ent stages in the formation of the opposition against Parti-
do Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party, PLN). The 
consolidation of the PLN in 1951 was an expression of the 
new social forces that won the Civil War. Since 1953, the 
PLN has competed in every election and become the major 
political force. On the other hand, the opposition used a se-
ries of alliances and electoral coalitions to compete against 
PLN, holding the presidency several times under different la-
bels, until the formation of the Partido Unidad Social Cristi-
ana (Social Christian Unity Party, Pusc) in 1983. Hence, the 
1986 election marked a turning point toward the consolida-
tion of the bipartisan system.The PLN and the Pusc gathered 
similar electoral shares, which encouraged the competitive-
ness between the two parties. From an ideological perspec-
tive, the system has a centripetal structure that brings both 
parties closer to the center (Hernández Naranjo, 2001: 256; 
Sánchez, 2003). Despite the 1980s economic crisis, biparti-
sanship brought stability to party competition until the end 
of the 1990s. The alternation of the executive functioned as 
a punishment to the party –PLN or Pusc– in government.
Studies have analyzed the changes that occurred in 
the party system after 1998, defining the process as one 
of electoral dealignment, characterized by diminished vot-
er turnout, growing support for new political parties, elec-
toral volatility, increased split-ticket voting, and constant 
questioning of the government authorities (Cascante, 2017; 
Hernández Naranjo, 2001; Raventós et al., 2005; Programa 
Estado de la Nación, 2015; Raventós, 2008; Rovira, 2001 
and 2007; Raventós, Fournier, Fernández & Alfaro, 2012; 
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Sánchez, 2003 and 2007; Seligson, 2001). The electoral 
dealignment is closely related to the structural transforma-
tion of the party system from the two-party configuration to 
a multiparty one. As a result, changes in electoral behavior 
have affected not only the governability process, but also 
the system of rewards and punishments that was evident 
during the era of bipartisanship, namely the alternation of 
the parties (PLN and Pusc) in the presidency.
Figure 1. Party system fragmentation
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From the 2002 elections and onwards, Costa Rica has had a 
much more fragmented structure of competition, as the rise 
in the effective number of parties suggests (Figure 1).The 
vote shares of PLN and Pusc decreased while the number 
of parties in the electoral competition increased. The first 
new parties that gathered more support were Partido Ac-
ción Ciudadana (Citizen Action Party, PAC), formed as a split 
of the PLN, and Movimiento Libertario (Libertarian Move-
ment, ML), a right-wing party that emerged from the Pusc.
The traditional bipartisan party system was further 
shaken in 2004 when two former Pusc presidents, Rafa-
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el Ángel Rodríguez and Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, were in-
volved in corruption scandals.8 These events damaged their 
own party electorally and became a source of the malaise 
with politics. In addition, the last two presidential elections 
of 2014 and 2018 were won not by any of the players of the 
bipartisan era but by PAC, the most successful political party 
from the multiparty period.
The most significant change has come from the party 
system transformation and the ensuing greater party frag-
mentation. The dealignment era opened the door for new 
parties both in the legislative and the executive branches. 
Henceforth, the clarity of responsibility has been affected 
more by the changes in the party system and the inclusion 
of new actors than by significant changes in the institution-
al framework of the executive. It is thus expected that only 
the former will have some impact on presidential approval.
The welfare regime. Despite being a middle-income 
country, Costa Rica holds a special place in Latin America 
regarding social policy as a near universalistic social state. 
This is no accident, since empirical, cross-country stud-
ies evidence a strong link between democratic consolida-
tion and social expenditure (Brown & Hunter, 1999; Huber, 
Mustillo, & Stephens, 2008).
During the second half of the twentieth century, the so-
cial security system in Costa Rica was gradually expand-
ed to include all income groups under one unified system 
(Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2014). Social 
spending grew as well, from 7% of the GDP in 1958 to 
14.9% in 1980, being substantively higher than in other 
Central American countries (Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-
Ancochea, 2013; Filgueira, 2014).The universal services 
of health-care, education, and pensions are complement-
ed by targeted policies for the poor (Martínez Franzoni & 
Sánchez-Ancochea, 2013). State interventionism is also re-
8 So far, no PLN president has been convicted of corruption, unlike these examples 
of the PUSC, so this issue has been excluded from the analysis of Arias’s case.
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vealed in the provision of the main utilities (water, elec-
tricity, and telephone) through public companies.What is 
more, many welfare services have demonstrated their re-
silience in the face of the economic crisis of the 80s and 
the structural transformations of the 90s (Martínez Franzo-
ni & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2013: 58). This comparatively ro-
bust welfare state and the stable evolution of social poli-
cies suggest that social outcomes are desirable and well 
regarded by the citizens.9
Social spending has been one of the main electoral pro-
posals of PLN, endorsing the expansion of opportunities, 
the construction of a society based on solidarity and equity, 
and the role of a strong state as a necessary in the creation 
of conditions of social justice, especially for housing pro-
grams and the fight against poverty (Solís Rivera & Alpízar, 
2003: 25). In view of the importance of social investment 
in the Costa Rican democracy and the electoral value that 
this represents for the PLN, we consider this variable to be a 
meaningful explanation to be explored.
In brief, the Costa Rican case is one of institutional and 
democratic stability, with significant changes in the par-
ty system (mainly fragmentation), weak president powers, 
and a robust welfare state. These three characteristics will 
help us propose hypotheses in the following section.
Presidential popularity in Costa Rica and hypotheses
Figure 2 shows the ebbs and flows of monthly presiden-
tial approval (from August 1978 to April 2016), as regis-
tered in the Executive Approval Database 1.0 (Carlin et al., 
2016). Overall, there is a visible cycle of honeymoon, de-
cay, and recovery. Upon closer inspection, some deviations 
emerge: the impressive low approval ratings between 1979 
and 1982 are without doubt related to the economic cri-
9 Public opinion favors the government intervention in the economy. According 
to survey data, 94.3% believe that the State should guarantee free access to 
health services and public education (Pignataro and Cascante, 2017: 28).
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sis of that period. Thereafter, incumbents seem to follow 
the traditional “U” pattern in their mandates (see Stimson, 
1976).10 Still, the comparative analysis among Latin Amer-
ican countries performed by Carlin et al. (2018) highlight-
ed some deviations from the standard cyclicality during the 
two nonconsecutive terms of president Oscar Arias (1986-
1990 and 2006-2010). In both presidential terms, there is 
an unexpected improvement halfway through the mandate 
and strong recoveries at the end. In addition, the honey-
moon is present during the first Arias presidency, not so in 
the second one. 
Figure 2. Presidential approval (monthly)
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To account for these peculiarities, we propose two general 
explanations that apply to the whole period, not just Arias’s 
presidencies. First, the electoral support is related to the 
magnitude of the honeymoon (Carlin, Martínez-Gallardo, 
& Hartlyn, 2012: 208-209). As described before, the party 
10 The statistical analysis confirms that when (quarterly) approval is regressed 
on time there is no trend, but a significant quadratic effect of the time in of-
fice exists.
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system has changed radically in Costa Rica since 2002: the 
number of significant parties increased, making elections 
more competitive and the outcomes closer. Before 2002 
no runoff elections were needed, since every winner was 
able to reach the 40% of the vote required; afterwards, run-
offs have been held in 2002, 2014, and 2018. Accordingly, 
while Arias 1 ran under the period of bipartisan competi-
tion, facing only one big rival party, Arias 2 did so under a 
multiparty system configuration and won the election with 
little more than one percentage point over his adversary. 
Under a context of higher competitiveness and fragmenta-
tion, presidents start their terms backed by smaller propor-
tions of the electorate, reducing the probability of having 
a consensual approval at the beginning of their mandates. 
Therefore, we expect that the vote share of the presiden-
tial winner is positively associated with the initial approv-
al ratings –i.e. the honeymoon (H1a). Accordingly, since 
majorities are harder to get with more competitive parties, 
fragmentation shrinks early popularity of presidents (H1b). 
Second, we know that, according to the VP-function, a 
good economy will lead to rewarding the incumbent (Bel-
lucci & Lewis-Beck, 2011; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; 
Sanders, 2000).This has been proven true in the United 
States and Western European democracies. Given its demo-
cratic and institutional stability, the VP-function should be 
valid for Costa Rica as well. Hence, economic variables im-
pact popularity (H2).
However, we argue that, in addition to economic vari-
ables such as inflation, growth, and unemployment rates, 
Costa Ricans also take the government’s performance on 
social policy into account. As previously explained, over the 
decades Costa Rica has built a strong, near universal wel-
fare regime (Martínez Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2013 
and 2014), backed by public opinion and traditional politi-
cal parties, especially PLN. Under these conditions, citizens 
might set a higher bar for incumbents: not only should the 
governments provide good economic results, but also social 
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investment in health care, pensions, education, and target-
ed policies for low-income brackets.
There is some prior empirical evidence backing this 
argument. Studies have found that satisfaction with pub-
lic services positively impacts trust in government (Chris-
tensen and Laegreid, 2005) and political support for the 
president (Pignataro, 2016). Furthermore, in Costa Rica, both 
of Arias’s mandates –the outliers– are closely identified with 
social programs. Throughout the electoral campaign and his 
first presidency, Arias advanced policies on housing, open-
ing a new funding system for house development (Banco 
Hipotecario de la Vivienda) and distributing vouchers for 
low-income families (Rojas, 1995; Trejos & Sáenz, 2011). 
In his second term, Arias enacted the conditional transfer 
system for education known as Avancemos, seeking to pre-
vent school dropouts. A relative boost in social expenditure 
during Arias’s governments, as exemplified by the above-
mentioned programs, could be the reason behind his un-
expectedly high approval during midway through the term 
and toward the end. The positive effect of social programs 
on presidential approval is expected to come not only from 
the direct impact on the recipients and their families –who 
would react positively toward the government– but also 
from public opinion in general, since programs are adver-
tised through the different political communication chan-
nels. To sum up, we will test if higher social expenditure 
increases the executive approval (H3).
Results
To analyze the connection between vote share and the 
honeymoon (H1), we use the percentage of votes secured 
by the presidential winner on the first electoral round. In 
order to have an indicator of electoral support with a de-
nominator that is similar to that of approval (i.e. the whole 
population), we calculate the percentage of votes over total 
electorate (not over the valid votes).
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Table 1. Vote shares and honeymoon
Year President % of votes over total Approval 1st quarter Approval 2nd quarter
1982 Monge 45.1 17.6 29.2
1986 Arias 1 41.7 73.8 51.3
1990 Calderón 41.1 76.0 42.5
1994 Figueres 39.3 53.8 43.6
1998 Rodríguez 31.9 36.4 34.2
2002 Pacheco 25.9 51.4 58.8
2006 Arias 2 26.1 35.2 45.3
2010 Chinchilla 31.8 51.7 52.4
2014 Solís 20.5 49.3 44.4
Source: approval ratings from Carlin et al. (2016); electoral data from  
Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (2014).
The correlation between the vote share and the approv-
al during the 1st quarter is lackluster:r = 0.133. However, 
there are two extreme values: Monge’s approval is unusu-
ally low (17.6%), while Calderón’s is too high (76.0%). This 
could be due to an estimation error by the algorithm giving 
too much weight to previous values.11 If we omit these two 
outliers while lowering the number of cases, the correla-
tion coefficient rises to r = 0.596. The correlation with the 
second quarter is nevertheless negative: r = -0.407. In con-
clusion, there is some evidence that electoral support helps 
the president enjoy a brief period of favorable ratings of one 
quarter –but no longer than that–, backing H1a. Further-
more, fragmentation makes honeymoons less likely, as they 
are negatively correlated (r = -0.109). In the bipartisan pe-
riod (1982-1998) the mean vote share received was 39.8%, 
while during fragmentation era (2002-2014) it was 26.0%. 
Accordingly, the average approval during the first quarter 
dropped from 54.7% (or 51.5% including outliers) to 46.9%. 
Our data back H1b.
11 In individual surveys, Monge’s rating was 24.0% in July while Calderón’s was 
34.0%, hence the algorithm underestimates the former and overestimates the 
latter. We thank Ryan Carlin for this clarification.
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We now consider the whole quarterly time series in 
Costa Rica from 1980 to 2016, using Carlin et al.’s (2016) 
data.12 Table 2 presents the estimated OLS time-series mod-
els.13 Since a correlogram (not shown because of space 
constrains) suggests the presence of an autoregressive ef-
fect, we include the dependent variable lagged one quarter 
among the set of independent variables.
The first model specifies a classical VP-function by in-
cluding GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation (all 
lagged variables).14 None is significant at the conventional 
levels, implying that the economy is not the main driver of 
presidential approval. The mainstream literature also sug-
gests that the year of the term (or cost of ruling) and the 
effective number of parties (measuring fragmentation) may 
have an impact on popularity ratings. However, neither is 
a significant predictor when added to the economic mod-
el (estimates not shown). Thus, we cannot verify H2 that 
claims economic variables influence approval. 
Since we proposed that social expenditure has positive 
effects over approval, a second model includes social ex-
penditure growth (interannual change) and social expendi-
ture over GDP.15 Both variables are indirect sources of social 
policy outcomes. The assumption is that when social ex-
12 The 1.0 database lacked information for the last two quarters of 2016. We com-
pleted those years by imputing the values from the surveys of August and No-
vember of Centro de Investigación y Estudios Políticos(CIEP).
13 The time series is stationary according to both the Dickey-Fuller and the KPSS 
tests. Also, suspicions could arise that the errors are heteroskedastic, so an 
ARCH model could be preferable, but this option was rejected through Engle’s 
Lagrange multiplier test.
14 Inflation rates and GDP growth were compiled by the International Monetary 
Fund, available at https://www.imf.org/en/Data. Unemployment rates were 
gathered by Programa Estado de la Nación from official sources. Quarterly per-
centage changes were calculated from the original yearly data using the Palm-
er and Whitten’s (1999) method, as explained in Carlin, Love, and Martínez-
Gallardo (2015a).
15 Social expenditure was calculated by Mata and Trejos (2017) with data from 
the national budget office of the Central Bank of Costa Rica, the National Insti-
tute of Statistics and Census, and other involved institutions. It sums expenses 
on education, health, housing, and culture and recreation, including anti-pov-
erty programs, pensions, and scholarships, among others. 
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penditure is higher, the government implements more and 
better programs, thus producing social outcomes perceived 
by citizens. Supporting H3 and controlling for economic 
variables, the model finds there to be a positive, significant 
effect (p< 0.10) of social expenditure growth on approval, 
but not of social expenditure over GDP.
Could this equation account for Arias’s exceptional high-
er approval? We tested this using dummy variables for each 
Arias term (model 3). These dummy variables are significant 
(p< 0.05), implying that approval was higher on the aver-
age during his tenure. Instead, social expenditure growth is 
not significant any more (social expenditure over GDP was 
excluded from the model given its non-significance in mod-
el 2). The exceptionality persists.
It is possible that social expenditure growth was particu-
larly important during the Arias years, and that the dummies 
are thus masking the effects of said growth. Either Arias is a 
president with superior social expenditure growth, or he is a 
president with extraordinarily high approval for reasons oth-
er than social expenditure. To address this issue, we first esti-
mated the interaction effects between Arias’s term and social 
expenditure growth. However, these terms are not signifi-
cant (results available upon request). Therefore, we delve in-
to the political context of Arias’s presidencies because, as the 
literature states, political events have an impact on approval.
The first Arias mandate was marked by an active for-
eign policy in Central America that sought to bring peace to 
the region. This goal was accomplished by the Esquipulas II 
Accords. For this work, Arias was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1987.16
Conversely, the 2006-2010 Arias administration was 
characterized by social polarization regarding the Free 
16 This was quite an acclaimed event by the international press due to the fact 
that it was nominated by only one person (Bjorn Molin, a member of the 
Swedish Parliament) and because it was an ongoing process, which also did 
not have the support of the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan 
(Schememann, 1987).
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Trade Agreement between Central America and the Unit-
ed States of America (Cafta), which was finally approved 
in a referendum with a margin of 3.2 percentage points: 
51.6% voted “Yes”; 48.4% voted “No” (Rojas Bolaños, 2009). 
On the international domain, Arias led a very active, multi-
lateral foreign policy: he moved Costa Rica’s embassy from 
Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, established relations with China, ac-
complished a non-permanent seat in the United Nations 
Security Council for a third time, took part in the media-
tion efforts in Honduras after the 2009 coup, and advanced 
global initiatives on environment and arms trade regula-
tion (Segura Ramírez et al., 2010). Nevertheless, we believe 
that the Cafta referendum may have had a bigger impact 
on public opinion because of its domestic implications, the 
mass mobilizations –for and against–, and the fact it was a 
campaign issue in 2006.
Rather than relying on the dummy variables for Arias, we 
therefore include indicators for the most important political 
events during his tenure: the Nobel Prize (from the last quar-
ter of 1987 until the end of his presidency)17 and the Cafta 
referendum (from the last quarter of 2007 on).18 Model 4 
indicates, first, that the effect of social expenditure growth 
remains (p< 0.10). Second, approval is higher after the 
announcement of the Nobel Prize (p< 0.10), but not after the 
Cafta referendum. These results make sense given that the lat-
ter event yields almost equal proportion of “winners” and 
“losers” in relation to the outcome of the referendum. The 
Nobel Prize, instead, could be seen as a valence issue that 
brought fame and prestige to the country as a whole beyond 
partisan lines; that is, a positive “rally ’round the flag” event. 
Additionally, we ran a fifth model with data from 1983 
onwards, excluding several quarters with hyperinflation 
due to the economic crisis of the 1980s that could damage 
the overall estimation. Social expenditure and the dummy 
17 The award was announced on October 13, 1987.
18 The Cafta referendum was held on October 7, 2007.
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for Nobel Prize are still significant (p< 0.05) when confined 
to “ordinary” economic times, whereas referendum and the 
economic variables are not.19
Models 2, 4 and 5 help us confirm H3: social expendi-
ture had a significant effect on presidential approval. After 
the crisis, a more stable economic period when social ex-
penditure is increased by one percentage point from one 
year to the other, presidential approval grows by 0.3 per-
centage points. Considering the maximum and minimum 
empirical values in the series, the effect would range be-
tween a positive boost of 4.4 percentage points and a re-
duction of 3.7 on approval. Whether this is high or low is 
more the purview of a politician. The most important find-
ing is that presidents do get credit for expanding social ex-
penditure.If incumbents care for approval, social expendi-
ture is a means of increasing it.
Do the models explain the “Arias exceptionality”? An ex-
amination of residuals from model 4 sheds some light. In 
Figure 4 the positive residual indicates that the model pre-
dicted a lower-than-observed approval (underestimation); 
while a negative means that the fitted value was higher 
than the real one (overestimation). We note there are sev-
eral large residuals (more than 10 points) not only dur-
ing Arias’s presidencies, but throughout the time span. In 
Arias’s mandates there are four large residuals: one posi-
tive (2nd quarter of 1987) and three negatives (3rd quarter of 
1986, 1st quarter of 1988, and 3rd quarter of 2008). While 
Carlin et al. (2018) state that Arias’s approval cycle deviat-
ed because of strong recoveries (positive observed values), 
we find the opposite: our model predicted higher approv-
al rates in three quarters than what is observed (see Ap-
pendix). These outliers could be due to events that are not 
measured, or mismeasurement of independent variables. 
Either way, they seem to behave randomly. 
19 No model presents issues of error autocorrelation according to the Breusch-
Godfrey test.
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Table 2 
OLS models for presidential approval (quarterly)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Approvalt-1 0.846
*** 0.842*** 0.774*** 0.812*** 0.812***
(0.0454) (0.0452) (0.0496) (0.0466) (0.0503)
GDP growth t-1 -0.221 -0.102 -0.162 -0.104 -0.245
(0.294) (0.305) (0.296) (0.300) (0.308)
Unemploymentt-1 -0.406 -0.195 -0.0786 -0.0318 -0.262
(0.492) (0.599) (0.487) (0.503) (0.511)
Inflationt-1 0.0491 0.0659 0.0660 0.0695 0.00117
(0.0550) (0.0801) (0.0549) (0.0558) (0.0634)
Social expenditure growth 0.190* 0.140 0.206* 0.264**
(0.108) (0.104) (0.107) (0.127)
Social expenditure over GDP -0.0480
(0.328)
Arias 1 4.690**
(2.000)
Arias 2 4.964**
(1.907)
Nobel Prize 4.448* 4.754**
(2.364) (2.366)
Cafta referendum 3.274 2.908
(2.308) (2.350)
Constant 8.911* 7.388 7.819 6.106 8.894*
(5.028) (6.932) (5.017) (5.128) (5.316)
Observations 143 143 143 143 136
Adjusted R2 0.727 0.729 0.746 0.737 0.716
Breusch-Godfrey test
(p-value) 0.087 0.125 0.111 0.095 0.168
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01
If the models accurately explain approval and the residuals 
show only random deviations, then there is no “Arias ex-
ceptionality”. Nevertheless, Oscar Arias is without doubt a 
famous and worldwide respected politician, and approval 
may stem from personal prestige and reputation, according 
to some scholars (Neustadt, 1990). When current surveys 
ask about the retrospective approval of former presidents, 
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Arias usually ranks amongst the highest, suggesting the 
“Arias effect”.20
Figure 4
Analysis of residuals (model 4)
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Nevertheless, Figure 5 shows that when the average grade 
is separated between partisans of the former presidents’ 
party and the rest of the population, there is a statistically 
significant gap dividing both groups (7.7 vs. 5.6; p< 0.001). 
Arias’s popularity among his supporters resembles that of 
Calderón (Pusc) among his; while non-partisans view Arias 
as only slightly more positive than other former presidents 
and even lower than Pacheco (Pusc). 
Arias’s overall mean approval rating is inflated by the fact 
that his party, PLN, draws the highest number of partisans. In 
conclusion, his political persona is not as homogeneously ac-
claimed as sometimes assumed, and partisanship plays a sig-
nificant role when public opinion assesses former presidencies.
20 However, his public standing may suffer in future surveys due to accusations of 
sexual assault that have recently emerged.
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Figure 5. Popularity of former presidens (March, 2016)
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Source: own elaboration based on CIEP (2017).
Discussion
This paper intended to shed some light on an understudied 
topic in Costa Rica: executive approval. As a long-standing 
presidential democracy with few significant constitutional 
reforms, it is a suitable and valuable case for analyzing the 
highs and lows of incumbents’ popularity. The challenge 
lay in examining both ordinary and unusual presidential 
approval rates from 1980 to 2016. Oscar Arias’s two terms 
showed a typical pattern, defined by different levels of ini-
tial approval (“honeymoon”) and outstandingly high levels 
halfway through and at the end.
A quick review of the historical context reveals that clar-
ity of responsibility should have changed little since the es-
tablishment of free and fair political competition: the elec-
toral rules and the formal powers of the president have 
remained the same. However, the party system and elector-
al behavior have suffered deep transformations since 1998: 
fragmentation increased, and the party system evolved 
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from a two-party to a multiparty configuration. Since then, 
electoral competition has become more intense given the 
plurality of actors.
We have shown that the vote share has an impact on 
the initial approval ratings of Costa Rica’s presidents, which 
is why president Arias enjoyed an approval of 62.6% in the 
first two quarters of 1986, while it was only 40.3% in 2006. 
His vote shares (over the total number of voters) were just 
as different: 41.7% and 26.1%. Thus, the fragmentation of 
the party system has indirectly impacted presidential ap-
proval. Under multi-party competition, it becomes harder to 
receive votes from large proportions of the electorate that 
could easily be translated to initial support when in office.
We subsequently tested hypotheses regarding the posi-
tive impact of economic conditions and social expenditure 
on approval. We stated that, in a country with a near univer-
sal social state, citizens will expect not only good economic 
performance –growth, low unemployment, controlled infla-
tion– but also social investment in education, healthcare, 
housing, basic utilities, and targeted programs to fight 
poverty, among others. The time series of approval in Costa 
Rica showed some nuances regarding the presidencies of 
Oscar Arias since he enjoyed particularly good ratings in 
the middle and toward the conclusion of both terms. Given 
our knowledge of prominent social policies enacted by his 
government on housing and education, we suspected that 
its exceptionality was due to social expenditure. The mod-
els showed that economic conditions, the term year, and 
the effective number of parties, although highlighted by the 
literature, did not have an impact on approval. Conversely, 
social expenditure did exhibit significant effects.
Although the approval during Arias’s presidencies was 
higher than the average, when we control for political events 
during his tenure –namely the Nobel Peace Prize and the 
Cafta referendum– social expenditure growth proves to be 
significant. Hence, instead of a general “Arias effect”, there 
is a specific impact of social programs and investment, and 
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the national recognition of his foreign policy in Central 
America that culminated with the Nobel. While the prize 
could be regarded as a valence issue for the country, a “ral-
ly ’round the flag” event, the Cafta referendum was highly 
polarizing, not affecting approval since public opinion was 
split in half between supporters (Arias’s position) and op-
ponents of Cafta. Finally, we observed that Arias’s reputa-
tion as a former president is largely partisan, since his par-
ty, PLN, has remained strong –despite some recent electoral 
decline– since 1953.
Our conclusion on the validity of social expenditure as 
a predictor of approval cannot reject economic theories of 
voting; rather, we are complementing them. In our view, 
if citizens are satisfied with both economic and social out-
comes, incumbents are rewarded either through popular-
ity indicators (as we tested), or in the ballot box (which we 
did not examine). On the one hand, we suspect that the 
existence of a near universal welfare regime in Costa Rica 
is a scope condition for the validity of social expenditure 
as an explanatory variable. Cross-country comparisons be-
tween nations with dissimilar social regimes are needed to 
verify the external validity of the hypothesis. On the other, 
future studies require a more accurate and comprehensive 
measure of events (Newman and Forcehimes, 2010), includ-
ing political scandals and international events, to reach more 
solid conclusions about the exceptionality (or not) of Arias’s 
presidencies and the role of economic and social policies 
on mass approval of incumbents.
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Appendix
Observed and predicted approval ratings (from model 4)
Arias 1 Arias 2
Year Quarter Observed Predicted Year Quarter Observed Predicted
1986 2 73.8 64.8 2006 2 35.2 30.1
1986 3 51.3 69.8 2006 3 45.4 35.6
1986 4 54.4 51.5 2006 4 50.6 43.8
1987 1 60.0 51.0 2007 1 51.6 48.5
1987 2 73.3 55.7 2007 2 51.8 49.3
1987 3 59.1 66.5 2007 3 51.2 49.4
1987 4 61.3 59.6 2007 4 54.7 52.2
1988 1 41.9 59.7 2008 1 58.6 54.9
1988 2 41.8 44.0 2008 2 52.2 58.2
1988 3 44.0 44.0 2008 3 35.8 53.0
1988 4 48.1 45.8 2008 4 43.0 39.8
1989 1 45.2 51.5 2009 1 49.2 45.8
1989 2 50.5 49.0 2009 2 49.1 50.7
1989 3 57.9 53.3 2009 3 56.5 50.5
1989 4 67.8 59.2 2009 4 59.0 56.3
1990 1 71.5 63.9 2010 1 61.2 57.8
